Abstract. Church's synthesis problem asks whether there exists a finite-state stream transducer satisfying a given input-output specification. For specifications written in Monadic Second-Order Logic over infinite words, Church's synthesis can theoretically be solved algorithmically using automata and games. We revisit Church's synthesis via the Curry-Howard correspondence by introducing SMSO, a non-classical subsystem of MSO, which is shown to be sound and complete w.r.t. synthesis thanks to an automata-based realizability model.
Introduction
A stream function F : Σ ω → Γ ω is synchronous (or causal) if it can produce a prefix of length n of its output from a prefix of length n of its input: B(0). · · · .B(n − 1) = C(0). · · · .C(n − 1) =⇒ F (B)(n) = F (C)(n) (for B, C ∈ Σ ω ) A synchronous function is finite-state if it is induced by a deterministic letter-to-letter stream transducer (or deterministic Mealy machine (DMM)). Church's synthesis [4] consists in the automatic extraction of DMMs from input-output specifications, typically presented as sentences of the form ∀X Σ ∃Y Γ ϕ(X; Y ) (1.1) where ϕ is a formula of some subsystem of Monadic Second-Order Logic (MSO) over ω-words. A specification as in (1.1) is realized in the sense of Church by a (finite-state) synchronous F : Σ ω → Γ ω when ϕ(B, F (B)) holds for all B ∈ Σ ω .
MSO over ω-words is a decidable logic by Büchi's Theorem [2] . It subsumes non-trivial logics used in verification such as LTL (see e.g. [24, 16] ). Traditional approaches to synthesis (see e.g. [25, 26] ) are based, via McNaughton's Theorem [15] , on the translation of MSOformulae to deterministic automata on ω-words (such as Muller or parity automata).
1 Such automata are then turned into game graphs, in which the Opponent O (∀bélard) plays input characters to which the Proponent P (∃loïse) replies with output characters. Solutions to Church's synthesis are then given by the Büchi-Landweber Theorem [3] , which says that in such games, either P or O has finite-state winning strategy.
Fully automatic approaches to synthesis suffer from prohibitively high computational costs, essentially for the following two reasons. First, the translation of MSO-formulae to automata is non-elementary, and McNaughton Theorem involves a non-trivial powerset construction (such as Safra construction, see e.g. [24, 16] ). Second, similarly as with other automatic verification techniques based on Model Checking, the solution of parity games ultimately relies on exhaustive state exploration. While they have had (and still have) considerable success for verifying concurrency properties, such techniques hardly managed up to now to give practical algorithms for synthesis (even for fragments of LTL, see e.g. [1] ).
In this work, we propose a Curry-Howard approach to Church's synthesis. The CurryHoward correspondence asserts that, given a suitable proof system, any proof therein can be interpreted as a program. This interpretation of proofs as programs (as well as the soundness of many type systems) can be formalized using the technique of realizability, which tells how to read a formula from the logic as a specification for a program. More precisely, realizability can be seen as a relation between programs (the realizers) and formulae, usually defined by induction on the latter (see e.g. [23, 11] ). Typical clauses state e.g. that realizers of conjunctions ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 are pairs R 1 , R 2 consisting of a realizer R 1 of ϕ 1 and a realizer R 2 of ϕ 2 , and that realizers of existential formulae ∃X ϕ(X) are pairs B, R consisting of a witness B for the ∃X and a realizer R of ϕ(B).
Our starting point is the fact that MSO on ω-words can be completely axiomatized as a subsystem of second-order Peano arithmetic [22] (see also [20] ). From the classical axiomatization of MSO, we derive an intuitionistic restriction SMSO (for Synchronous MSO). SMSO comes equipped with an extraction procedure which is sound and complete w.r.t. Church's synthesis: proofs of SMSO-formulae of the form ∃X ϕ(X; Y ) (with only X free) can be translated to DMMs and such proofs exist for all solvable instances of Church's synthesis. The key point in our approach is that on the one hand, DMMs are constructively extracted from proofs in SMSO, while on the other hand, their correctness involves the full power of MSO. So in particular, our adaptation of the usual Adequacy Lemma of realizability does rely on the non-constructive proof of correctness of deterministic automata obtained by McNaughton's Theorem (see e.g. [24] ), while these automata do not have to be concretely built during the extraction procedure.
The paper is organized as follows. We first recall in §2 some background on MSO and Church's synthesis. Our intuitionistic system SMSO is then presented in §3. We provide in §4 some technical material as well as detailed examples on the representation of DMMs in MSO, and §5 presents our realizability model. Finally, in §6 we present our realizability model in terms of indexed categories (see e.g. [9] ), an essential step for further generalizations.
We also have included three appendices. They give detailed arguments and constructions that we did not wanted to put in the body of the paper, either because they are necessary but unsurprising technicalities (App. A and C), or because they concern important but side results, proved with different techniques than those emphasized in this paper (App. B). (3) The DMM depicted in Fig. 1 (right) , taken from [25] , induces a synchronous function F : 2 → M 2 such that Φ(A, F (A)) holds for all A ∈ 2 ω , where Φ is the relation of of Ex. 2.1. (4) Synchronous functions are obviously continuous (taking the product topology on Σ ω and Γ ω , with Σ, Γ discrete), but there are continuous functions which are not synchronous, for instance the function P : 2 ω → 2 ω such that P (A)(n) = 1 iff A(n + 1) = 1.
For the definition and adequacy of our realizability interpretation ( §5), it is convenient to note that alphabets and (finite-state) synchronous functions form a categoy.
Proposition 2.5. Synchronous functions form a category S whose objects are alphabets and whose morphisms from Σ to Γ are the synchronous functions Σ → S Γ. The identity on Σ is the synchronous function of Ex. 2.4. (1), and composition is usual function composition. Moreover, if the S-maps F : Σ → S Γ and G : Γ → S ∆ are finite-state, then so is G • F .
Proof. Since sets and functions form a category, S is a category as soon as composition of functions preserves synchronicity. Consider synchronous G : Γ ω → ∆ ω and F : Σ ω → Γ ω . Assume (G • F )(B)↾n = (G • F )(C)↾n (for B, C ∈ Σ ω ) We have G(F (B))↾n = G(F (C))↾n. Since G is synchronous it follows that F (B)↾n = F (C)↾n, and since F is synchronous we deduce B↾n = C↾n.
For the second part of the statment, assume that G and 
Proposition 2.5 implies that S has a wide subcategory consisting of finite-state functions. Definition 2.6 (The Category M). Let M be the category whose objects are alphabets and whose morphisms from Σ to Γ are finite-state synchronous functions Σ → M Γ.
Note that for M to be a category (namely for the associativity and identity laws of composition) it is essential that M-maps consists of functions rather than machines. The following obvious fact is useful for our realizability model ( §5). It is also worth noticing that the category M has finite products.
Proposition 2.8. The category M has finite products. The product of Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n (for n ≥ 0) is given by the Set-product
Remark 2.9. Although this is not required and not done in this paper, it is convenient to consider, as in [18] , an extension of MSO with a term language for Mealy machines. The induced (syntactic) notion of substitution may seem in conflict with using Mealy functions rather than machines. In §6 we instantiate to our framework usual tools from categorical logic which neatly handle such situations.
2.3.
Monadic Second-Order Logic (MSO) on Infinite Words. We consider a formulation of MSO based on a purely relational two-sorted language, with a specific choice of atomic formulae. There is a sort of individuals, with variables x, y, z, etc., and a sort of (monadic) predicates, with variables X, Y, Z, etc. Our formulae for MSO, denoted ϕ, ψ, etc. are given in Fig. 2 . They are defined by mutual induction with the deterministic formulae (denoted δ, δ ′ , etc.) from atomic formulae ranged over by α. MSO formulae are interpreted in the standard model N of ω-words as usual. Individual variables range over natural numbers n, m, . . . ∈ N and predicate variables range over sets of natural numbers B, C, . . . ∈ P(N) ≃ 2 ω . The atomic predicates are interpreted as expected: . = is equality,∈ is membership,≤ is the relation ≤ on N, S is the successor relation, and Z holds on n iff n = 0. We often write X(x) or even Xx for x∈ X. We also use the following abbreviations. Notation 2.10. Given MSO-formulae ϕ and ψ, we let
MSO on ω-words is known to be decidable by Büchi's Theorem [2] .
Following [2] (but see also e.g. [16] ), the (non-deterministic) automata method for deciding MSO proceeds by a recursive translation of MSO-formulae to Büchi automata. A Büchi automaton is a non-deterministic finite state automaton running on ω-words. Büchi automata are equipped with a set of final states, and a run on an ω-word is accepting if it has infinitely many occurrences of final states. The crux of Büchi's Theorem is the effective closure of Büchi automata under complement. Let us recall a few known facts (see e.g. [24, 8] ) on the complementation of Büchi automata. First, the translation of MSO-formulae to automata is non-elementary. Second, its is known that deterministic Büchi automata are strictly less expressive than non-deterministic ones. Finally, it is known that complementation of Büchi automata is algorithmically hard: there is a family of languages (L n ) n>0 such that each L n can be recognized by a Büchi automaton with n + 2 states, but such that the complement of L n cannot be recognized by a Büchi automaton with less than n! states.
2.4.
Church's Synthesis for MSO. Church's synthesis problem for MSO is the following. Given as input an MSO formula ϕ(X; Y ) (with only free variables X = X 1 , . . . , X q and Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y p ), (1) decide whether there exist finite-state synchronous functions F = F 1 , . . . , F p : 2 q → M 2 such that N |= ϕ(A; F (A)) for all A ∈ (2 ω ) q ≃ (2 q ) ω , and (2), construct such F whenever they exist.
Given an MSO-formula ϕ(X, Y ) as above, we say that F : 2 q → M 2 p realizes ϕ(X; Y ) in the sense of Church (or Church-realizes ϕ(X; Y )) when ϕ(A, F (A)) holds for all A.
Example 2.12. The specification Φ of Ex. 2.1 can be officially written in the language of MSO as the following formula φ(X; Y ) (where ∃ ∞ t ϕ(t) stands for ∀x∃t(t≥ x ∧ ϕ(t))):
Church's synthesis has been solved by Büchi & Landweber [3] , using automata on ω-words and infinite two-player games (a solution is also possible via tree automata [19] ): there is an algorithm which, on input ϕ(X; Y ), (1) decides when a synchronous Church-realizer of ϕ(X; Y ) exists, (2) provides a DMM implementing it 2 , and (3) moreover provides a synchronous finite-state counter Church-realizer (i.e. a Church-realizer of ψ(Y ; X) := ¬ϕ(X; Y )) when no synchronous Church-realizer of ϕ(X; Y ) exists.
The standard algorithm solving Church's synthesis for MSO (see e.g. [25] ) proceeds via McNaughton's Theorem ( [15] , see also e.g. [16, 24] ), which states that Büchi automata can be translated to equivalent deterministic finite state automata, but equipped with stronger acceptance conditions than Büchi automata. There are different variants of such conditions (Muller, Rabin, Streett or parity conditions, see e.g. [24, 8] ). All of them can specify states which must not occur infinitely often in an accepting run. For the purpose of this paper, we only need to consider the simplest of them, the Muller conditions. A Muller condition is given by a family of set of states T , and a run is accepting when the set of states occurring infinitely often in it belongs to the family T . Theorem 2.13 (McNaughton [15] ). Each Büchi automaton is equivalent to a deterministic Muller automaton.
There is a lower bound in 2 O(n) for the number of states of a Muller automaton equivalent to a Büchi automaton with n states. The best known constructions for McNaughton's Theorem (such as Safra's construction or its variants) give deterministic Muller automata with 2 O(n log(n)) states from non-deterministic Büchi automata with n states.
The standard solution to Church's synthesis for MSO starts by translating ϕ(X; Y ) to a deterministic Muller automaton, and then turns this deterministic automaton into a twoplayer sequential game, in which the Opponent ∀bélard plays inputs bit sequences in 2 p while the Proponent ∃loïse replies with outputs bit sequences in 2 q . The game is equipped with an ω-regular winning condition (induced by the acceptance condition of the Muller automaton). The solution is then provided by Büchi-Landweber Theorem [3] , which states 2 It follows from the finite-state determinacy of ω-regular games that a finite-state synchronous Churchrealizer exists whenever a synchronous Church-realizer exists (see e.g. [25] ). that ω-regular games on finite graphs are effectively determined, and moreover that the winner always has a finite state winning strategy.
Example 2.14. Consider the last conjunct φ 2 [X, Y ] := (∃ ∞ t ¬Xt) → (∃ ∞ t ¬Y t) of the formula φ(X; Y ) of Ex. 2.12. When translating φ 2 to a finite state automaton, the positive occurrence of (∃ ∞ t ¬Y t) can be translated to a deterministic Büchi automaton. However, the negative occurrence of (∃ ∞ t ¬Xt) corresponds to (∀ ∞ t Xt) = (∃n ∀t≥ n Xt) and cannot be translated to a deterministic Büchi automaton. Even if a very simple two-state Muller automaton exists for (∀ ∞ t Xt), McNaughton's Theorem 2.13 is in general required for positive occurrences of the form ∀ ∞ t (−).
2.
5. An Axiomatization of MSO. Our approach to Church's synthesis relies on the fact that the MSO-theory of N can be completely axiomatized as a subsystem of second-order Peano arithmetic [22] (see also [20] ). For the purpose of this paper, it is convenient to axiomatize MSO with the non-logical rules of Fig. 5 together with the following comprehension and induction rules:
where z and y do not occur free in ϕ, ϕ, and where ϕ[ψ[y]/X] is the usual formula substitution, which commutes over all connectives (avoiding the capture of free variables), and with
As for the logical rules of MSO, we consider the presentation of two-sorted classical logic consisting of the rules of Fig. 3 together with the following rule of elimination of double negation:
Equality Rules:
Partial Order Rules:
Basic Z and S Rules (total injective relations):
Arithmetic Rules: Actually obtaining Thm. 2.16 from [20] requires some work. The difference between [20] and the present system is that the axiomatization of [20] is expressed in terms of the strict part of≤ (written<, see Notation 2.10) and that comprehension is formulated with the following usual axiom scheme (where X is not free in ϕ):
We state here the properties required to bridge the gap between [20] and the present axiomatization of MSO. Missing details are provided in App. A. First, the comprehension scheme of the present version of MSO directly implies (2.3), since using
In order to deal with the<-axioms of [20] , we rely on a series of arithmetical lemmas of MSO displayed in Fig. 6 . Finally, the induction axiom of [20] is the usual strong induction axiom:
Lemma 2.18. MSO proves the strong induction axiom (2.4). 
2).
As it is common with intuitionistic versions of classical systems, SMSO has the same language as MSO, and its deduction rules are based on intuitionistic predicate calculus (Fig. 3) . In order for SMSO to contain a negative translation of MSO while admitting a computational interpretation in the sense of §5, one has to devise appropriate counterparts to the comprehension and induction rules of MSO (2.1):
ϕ ⊢ ϕ (where z, y do not occur free in ϕ, ϕ). First, SMSO cannot have the comprehension rule of MSO. The reason is that monadic variables are computational objects in the realizability interpretation of SMSO ( §5), while the comprehension rule of MSO has instances in which the existential monadic quantification cannot be witnessed by computable functions from the parameters of ϕ, ψ and ϕ. The situation is similar to that of higher-type intuitionistic (Heyting) arithmetic, in which predicates, represented as characteristic functions, are computational objects (see e.g. [11] ). 3 The usual solution in that setting is to only admit negative translations of comprehension. We take a similar approach for SMSO. Thanks to Glivenko Theorem 3.6, this amounts to equip SMSO with the negative comprehension rule:
Second, for the extraction of synchronous functions from proofs, the induction scheme of MSO also has to be restricted. In view of Glivenko Theorem 3.6, one might consider the following scheme (where z, y do not occur free in ϕ, ϕ):
ϕ ⊢ ¬ϕ However, and in contrast with usual versions of Heyting arithmetic, such restricted induction scheme is not able to prove the elimination of double negation on atomic formulae. Fortunately, all atomic formulae of MSO can be interpreted by deterministic Büchi automata, and have a trivial computational content in the sense of §5. This more generally leads to the notion of deterministic formulae ( Fig. 2 ):
Deterministic formulae are to be interpreted by deterministic (not nec. Büchi) automata, and have trivial realizers. SMSO has the following deterministic induction rule (where z, y do not occur free in ϕ, δ):
In addition, SMSO has the following rule of double negation elimination on deterministic formulae:
We thus see deterministic formulae as the SMSO counterpart of the formulae of Heyting arithmetic admitting elimination of double negation (see e.g. [11] ). Furthermore, SMSO is equipped with a positive synchronous restriction of the comprehension rule of MSO, which gives Church-realizers for all solvable instances of Church's synthesis. The synchronous restriction of comprehension asks the comprehension formula to be uniformly bounded in the following sense. (1) Given SMSO-formulae ϕ and θ and a variable y, the relativization of ϕ to θ[y] (notation ϕ↾θ[y]), is defined by induction on ϕ as usual:
where, in the clauses for ∃, the variables x and X are assumed not to occur free in θ.
Note that y does not occur free in ϕ↾θ[y].
It is uniformly bounded if moreover x is the only free individual variable ofφ.
As we shall see in §4.3, bounded formulae are exactly those definable in MSO over finite words. We are now ready to define the system SMSO.
Definition 3.2 (The Logic SMSO). The logic SMSO has the same language as MSO. Its deduction rules are those given in Fig. 3 together with the rules of Fig. 5 and with the rules (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and the following rule of synchronous comprehension in whichφ is uniformly bounded by y:
The axiom ϕ, ¬¬δ ⊢ δ of double negation elimination for deterministic formulae would already be derivable in a version of SMSO where this axiom is weakened to double negation elimination for atomic formulae. We take ϕ, ¬¬δ ⊢ δ as an axiom because it admits trivial realizers.
Notation 3.4. In the following, we use a double horizontal line to denote admissible rules.
For instance, we freely use the weakening rule
A Glivenko Theorem for SMSO. Thanks to its limited vocabulary, SMSO satisfies a Glivenko theorem, and thus a very simple negative translation from MSO. Glivenko's theorem is usually stated only for propositional logic, but can be extended to formulae containing existentials; the impossible case is the universal quantification. In particular, should one extend the logical constructs with universal quantification by freely adjoining them to SMSO, this would no longer hold. This would actually not be such a severe consequence since our results would also hold with a usual recursive negative translation instead of ¬¬(−).
Proof. By induction on MSO-derivations, we show that if ϕ ⊢ ϕ is derivable in MSO, then ϕ ⊢ ¬¬ϕ is derivable in SMSO. This amounts to showing that for every MSO-rule of the form (ϕ i ⊢ ϕ i ) i∈I ψ ⊢ ψ the following rule is admissible in SMSO:
(ϕ i ⊢ ¬¬ϕ i ) i∈I ψ ⊢ ¬¬ψ The propositional rules may be treated exactly as in the usual proof of Glivenko's theorem for propositional logic, and it is well-known that Glivenko's theorem extends to existential quantifications (see e.g. [10, Thm. 59.(b) , §81]). It remains to deal with the non-logical rules of MSO. Comprehension: We have to prove that the following is admissible in SMSO:
ϕ ⊢ ¬¬∃X ψ But this directly follows from the negative comprehension scheme of SMSO together with the last rule of (3.4):
But this follows from deterministic induction together with the last rule of (3.4):
ϕ ⊢ ¬¬ϕ Elimination of Equality: We have to show that the following rule is admissible in SMSO:
= u is deterministic, by cutting the right premise with the deterministic doublenegation elimination rule of SMSO, we are left with deriving the following in SMSO:
But this is an instance of the rule of elimination of equality. Other Arithmetic Rules of MSO ( Fig. 5 ): All these rules have for premises and conclusion sequents of the form ϕ ⊢ δ where δ is deterministic. The premises of these rules may be cut with the deterministic double-negation elimination rule of SMSO. Supposing that the conclusion of such a rule is of shape ϕ ⊢ ϕ, we conclude from the fact that the following rule is admissible in SMSO:
The Main Result. We are now ready to state the main result of this paper, which says that SMSO is correct and complete (w.r.t. its provable existentials) for Church's synthesis. The correctness part (1) of Thm. 3.7 is be proved in §5 using a notion of realizability for SMSO based on automata and synchronous finite-state functions. The completeness part (2) is proved in §4.1, relying the completeness of the axiomatization of MSO (Thm. 2.16) together with the correctness of the negative translation ¬¬(−) (Thm. 3.6).
On the Representation of Deterministic Mealy Machines in MSO
This section gathers several (possibly known) results related to the representation of DMMS in MSO. We begin in §4.1 with the completeness part of Thm. 3.7, which follows usual representations of automata in MSO (see e.g. [24, §5.3] ). In §4.2, we then recall from [22, 20] the Recursion Theorem, which is a convenient tool to reason on runs of deterministic automata in MSO. In §4.3 we state a Lemma for the correctness part of Thm. 3.7, which relies on the usual translation of MSO-formulae over finite words to DFA's (see e.g. [24, §3.1]). Finally, in §4.4 we give a possible strengthening of the synchronous comprehension rule of SMSO (but which is based on Büchi's Theorem 2.11).
We work with the following notion of representation.
Definition 4.1 (Representation). Let ϕ be a formula with free variables among z, x 1 , . . . , x p , X 1 , . . . , X q . We say that ϕ z-represents F : 
Then F is represented by the formula
where X = X 1 , . . . , X p codes sequences of inputs, Y codes sequences of outputs, and where Q = Q 1 , . . . , Q q codes runs.
Remark 4.3. In the proof of Prop. 4.2, since M is deterministic, we can assume the formula I[Q(t)] to be of the form 1≤i≤q [Q i (t) ↔ B i ] with B i ∈ {⊤, ⊥}, and, for some propositional 
The completeness of our approach to Church's synthesis is obtained as follows.
Proof of Thm. 3.7. (2) . Assume that ϕ(X; Y ) admits a realizer C : 
Note that φ 0 and φ 1 are monotonic in Y , while φ 2 is anti-monotonic in Y . The formula φ 0 is trivially realized by the identity function 2 → M 2 (see Ex. 2.4. (1)), which is itself represented by the deterministic uniformly bounded formula δ 0 [X, x] := (x∈ X). For φ 1 (which asks Y not to have two consecutive occurrences of 0), consider
The case of φ 2 in Ex. 4.5 is more complex. The point is that
/Y ] does not hold because if ∀ ∞ t ¬Xt (that is if X remains constantly 0 from some time on), then δ 1 will output no 1's. On the other hand, the machine of Ex. 2.4.(3) involves an internal state, and can be represented using a fixpoint formula of the form (4.2). Reasoning on such formulae is easier with more advanced tools on MSO, that we provide in §4.2.
4.2.
The Recursion Theorem. Theorem 3.7.(2) ensures that SMSO is able to handle all solvable instances of Church's synthesis, but it gives no hint on how to actually produce proofs. When reasoning on fixpoint formulae as those representing DMMs in Prop. 4.2, a crucial role is played by the Recursion Theorem for MSO [22] (see also [20] ). The Recursion Theorem makes it possible to define predicates by well-founded induction w.r.t. the relatioṅ < (Notation 2.10). Given a formula ψ and variables X and x, we say that ψ is x-recursive in X when the following formula Rec
(where z, Z, Z ′ do not occur free in ψ). For ψ[X, x] x-recursive in X, the Recursion Theorem says that, provably in MSO, there is a unique set X such that ∀x(Xx ←→ ψ[X, x]).
The following examples give instances of the Recursion Theorem in formal reasonning on Mealy machines in MSO. 
One can proceed as follows. First note that if 0 is read from state 1, then the machine outputs 0. Moreover between two occurrences of 0 in the input with no intermediate input 1's, the only visited state of the machine is 1. Using induction, we thus have
It follows that if there are infinitely many 0's in the input, then there are infinitely many 0's in the output. Indeed, using induction and the excluded middle, we have Then, for all n ∈ N, all k ∈ (2 ω ) p with k i ≤ n, and all A ∈ (2 ω ) q , we have N |= with only x as free individual variable. Uniform boundedness is a purely syntactic restriction on comprehension, which have the advantage of being easy to check and conceptually simple to interpret in a proof relevant semantics. We present here a more semantic criterion on the formulae for which comprehension remain sound in a synchronous setting. We call a formula ψ[X, x] with only X, x free semantically bounded if the following closed formula B x X (ψ[X, x]), expressing that the truth value of ψ[X, n] only depends on the values of X up to n, holds:
We show in Thm. 4.11 below that semantically bounded MSO formulae are equivalent to uniformly bounded formulae. Since all uniformly bounded formulae are obviously semantically bounded, we have a semantic characterization of the formulae available for the synchronous comprehension scheme. 
The proof of Thm. 4.11 relies on the decidability of MSO and on two preliminary lemmas. The first one is the following usual transfer property (see e.g. [20] ). Given a set A ⊆ P(N), write N↾A for the model defined as the standard model N, but with individuals ranging over A (rather than N).
Lemma 4.12 (Transfer). Let ϕ ∈ Λ be a formula with free variables among x = x 1 , . . . , x p and X = X 1 , . . . , X q . Furthermore, let A ∈ 2 ω ≃ P(N) be non-empty. Then for all a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ A and all B ∈ (2 ω ) q we have
The second result is the following Splitting Lemma, reminiscent of the composition method from a technical point of view. The point of Lem. 4.13 is, given a formula ϕ and a distinghished first-order variable n, to express ϕ using an elementary combination of formulae, each local either to the inital segment [−≤ n] or the final segment [−> n]. Its proof is deferred to App. B. Write FV ι (ϕ) for the set of free individual variables of the formula ϕ. Lemma 4.13 (Splitting). Let an MSO-formula and z ∈ FV ι (ψ). For every V ⊆ FV ι (ψ) with z ∈ V , one can produce natural number N ψ and two matching sequences of length N ψ of left formulae (L V (ψ) j ) j<N ψ and right formulae (R V (ψ) j ) j<N ψ such that the following holds:
ι (ψ) = {x, z, y} with V = {x, z}, then for all n ∈ N, all a ≤ n and all b > n, we have
We can now prove Thm. 4.11.
Proof of Thm. 4.11. We work in the standard model N of MSO and obtain the result by completeness (Thm. 2.16). Using Lem. 4.13, we know that ψ[X, x] is equivalent to
writing L j (x, X) as a shorthand for L {x} (ψ(x, X)) j and R j (X) for R {x} (X) j . Then
Again using Lem. 4.12, for every j < N ψ and n ∈ N,
By substitutivity, it is equivalent to R ′ j (n)↾[−> n], where we set R ′ j := R j (⊥). Because R ′ j is closed and N↾[−> n] ≃ N, Lem. 4.12 moreover implies that
Since R ′ j is closed, it follows from the decidability of MSO (Thm. 2.11) that we can decide whether N |= R ′ j or N |= ¬R ′ j . Define accordingly closed formulae R ′′ j :
Notice in particular that, contrary to the R ′ j , the R ′′ j are invariant under relativisation, i.e., the formulae R ′′ j and R ′′ j ↾[− ≤ x] are syntactically equal. It thus follows that our initial ψ is equivalent to the following formulaφ, which is effectively computable from ψ:
The Realizability Interpretation of SMSO
We now present our realizability model for SMSO, and use it to prove Thm. 3.7.
(1). This realizability interpretation bears some similarity with usual realizability constructions for the Curry-Howard correspondance (see e.g. [23, 11] ). For instance, as in the usual setting, in our case a realizer of a formula ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 is a pair R 1 , R 2 of a realizer of R 1 of ϕ 1 and a realizer R 2 of ϕ 2 . Similarly, a realizer of ∃X ϕ(X) is a pair B, R of an ω-word B ∈ 2 ω and a realizaer of R for ϕ(B). However, our construction departs from the standard one on negation (for which we use McNaughton's Theorem 2.13), and for the fact that there is no primitive notion of implication in SMSO. In particular, in contrast with the usual settings, our notion of realizability for sequents of the form ψ ⊢ ϕ (see Thm. 5.10 and Def. 5.2) is not based on a notion of implication internal to the logic under consideration. Our approach to Church's synthesis via realizability uses automata in two different ways. First, from a proof D in SMSO of an existential formula ∃Y ϕ(X; Y ), one can compute a finite-state synchronous Church-realizer F of ϕ(X; Y ). Second, the adequacy of realizability (and in particular the correctness of F w.r.t. ϕ(X; Y )) is proved using automata for ϕ(X; Y ) obtained by McNaughton's Theorem, but these automata do not have to be built concretely.
5.1. Uniform Automata. The adequacy of realizability relies on the notion of uniform automata (adapted from [21] ). In our context, uniform automata are essentially usual nondeterministic automata, but in which non-determinism is expressed via an explicitly given set of moves. This enables a simple inheritance of the Cartesian structure of synchronous functions (Prop. 2.8), and thus to interpret the positive existentials of SMSO similarly as usual (weak) sums of type theory. In particular, the set of moves M (A) of an automaton A interpreting a formula ϕ exhibits the strictly positive existentials of ϕ as M (A) = M (ϕ) where
Definition 5.1 ((Non-Deterministic) Uniform Automata). A (non-deterministic) uniform automaton A over Σ (notation A : Σ) has the form
where Q A is the finite set of states, q ı A ∈ Q A is the initial state, M (A) is the finite non-empty set of moves, the acceptance condition Ω A is an ω-regular subset of Q ω A , and the transition function ∂ A has the form
A run of A on an ω-word B ∈ Σ ω is an ω-word R ∈ M (A) ω . We say that R is accepting (notation R A(B)) if (q k ) k∈N ∈ Ω A for the sequence of states (q k ) k∈N defined as q 0 := q ı A and q k+1 := ∂ A (q k , B(k), R(k)). We say that A accepts B if there exists an accepting run of A on B, and we let L(A), the language of A, be the set of ω-words accepted by A.
Following the usual terminology, an automaton A as in (5.2) is deterministic if M (A) ≃ 1.
Let us now sketch how uniform automata are used in our realizability interpretation of SMSO. First, by adapting to our context usual constructions on automata ( §5.2), to each SMSO-formula ϕ with free variables among (say) X = X 1 , . . . , X q , we associate a uniform automaton ϕ over 2 q (Fig. 7) . Then, from an SMSO-derivation D of a sequent (say) ϕ ⊢ ψ, with free variables among X as above, we extract a finite-state synchronous function
ψ (B) whenever R ϕ (B). In the case of ⊢ ∃Y φ(X; Y ), the finite-state realizer F D is of the form C, G with C and G finite-state synchronous functions C : 2 q −→ M 2 and G :
φ (B, C(B)) for all B. This motivates the following notion. F (B, R) ). It is easy to check the usual identity and composition laws of categories, namely:
Proof. Assume B F : A and B ∈ L(B) so that R B(B) for some R ∈ M (B) ω . Then by definition of B F : A, we have F (B, R) A(B), so that B ∈ L(A).
(2) One could also consider the category AUT Σ defined as Aut Σ , but with maps not required to be finite-state. All statements of §5 hold for AUT Σ , but for Cor. 5.11, which would lead to non necessarily finite-state realizers and would not give Thm. 3.7.
(1). (3) Uniform automata are a variation of usual automata on ω-words, which is convenient for our purposes, namely the adequacy of our realizability interpretation. Hence, while it would have been possible to define uniform automata with any of the usual acceptance conditions (see e.g. [24] ), we lose nothing by assuming their acceptance conditions to be given by arbitrary ω-regular sets. (4) Given automata A, B : Σ, checking the existence of a realizer A F : B can be reduced (e.g. using the tools of [18, 21] ) to checking the existence of a winning P-strategy in an ω-regular game on a finite graph, which can in turn be decided by the Büchi-Landweber Theorem [3] .
Constructions on Automata.
We gather here constructions on uniform automata that we need to interpret SMSO formulae. First, automata are closed under the following operation of finite substitution. 
and where (q n , q ′ n ) n ∈ Ω iff ((q n ) n ∈ Ω A and (q ′ n ) n ∈ Ω B ). Note that Ω is ω-regular since Ω A and Ω B are ω-regular (see e.g. [16, Ex. I.11.3.7] ). Moreover,
Proof. The Cartesian structure is directly inherited from M and is omitted. Moreover, we obviously have 
Uniform automata are equipped with the obvious adaptation of the usual projection on non-deterministic automata, which interprets existentials. Given a uniform automaton A : Σ × Γ, its projection on Σ is the automaton , (a, b) , u) Proposition 5.7. Given A : Σ × Γ and B : Σ, the realizers B F : ∃ Γ A are exactly the M-pairs C, G of finite-state synchronous functions
such that G(B, R) A B, C(B, R) for all B ∈ A ω and all R B(B).
Proof. Consider a realizer B F : ∃ Γ A, for some B : Σ with set of moves V . Then F is a synchronous function from Σ ω × V ω to (Γ × U ) ω ≃ Γ ω × U ω , and is therefore given by a pair C, G of synchronous functions
Moreover, given B ∈ Σ ω and R B(B), since F (B, R) ∃ Γ A(B), it is easy to see that G(B, R)
A ( B, C(B, R) ). Conversely, given C and G as in (5.3) , if G(B, R) A( B, C(B, R) ) for all B ∈ A ω and all R B(B), then we have B C, G : ∃ Γ A.
The negation ¬(−) of SMSO is interpreted by an operation ∼(−) on uniform automata which involves McNaughton's Theorem 2.13.
Proposition 5.8. Given a uniform automaton A : Σ, there is a uniform deterministic
Proof. Let U := M (A) and consider the (usual) deterministic automaton S over Σ × U with the same states as A and with transition function ∂ S defined as
Since Ω A is ω-regular, it is recognized by a nondeterministic Büchi automaton C over Q A . We then obtain a non-deterministic Büchi automaton B over Σ × U with state set
, where∃ U B is the usual projection of B on Σ (see e.g. [24] ). By McNaughton's Theorem 2.13,∃ U B is equivalent to a deterministic Muller automaton D over Σ. Then we let ∼A be the deterministic uniform automaton defined as D but with Ω ∼A the ω-regular set generated by the Muller condition S ∈ T iff S / ∈ T D (see e.g. 5.3. The Realizability Interpretation. We are now going to define our realizability interpretation. This goes in two steps: (1) To each formula ϕ we associate a uniform automaton ϕ . (2) To each derivation D of a sequent ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ⊢ ϕ in SMSO, we associate a finite state synchronous
(1) (stated as Corollary 5.11 below) then directly follows from the definition of ∃X ϕ . We first discuss step (1) . Consider a formula ϕ with free variables among x = x 1 , . . . , x p and X = X 1 , . . . , X q . Its interpretation is a uniform automaton ϕ x,X over 2 p × 2 q , defined by induction on ϕ, and such that δ x,X is deterministic for a deterministic δ. We thus have to devise a deterministic uniform automaton A α for each atomic formula α of SMSO. The definitions of the A α 's are easy and follow usual constructions (see e.g. [24] ). They are deferred to App. C. Moreover, in order to handle individual variables, the interpretation also uses a deterministic uniform automaton Sing : 2 accepting the language of ω-words B ∈ 2 ω ≃ P(N) such that B is a singleton. App. C also presents a possible definition for Sing. The interpretation ϕ x,X is defined in Fig. 7 , where π, π ′ are suitable projections. We write ϕ when x, X are irrelevant or understood from the context. Note that the set of moves M (ϕ) of ϕ indeed satisfies (5.1), so in particular δ is indeed deterministic for a deterministic δ. Moreover, as expected we get: Proposition 5.9. Given an SMSO-formula ϕ with free variables among x = x 1 , . . . , x p and X = X 1 , . . . , X q , for all k ∈ (2 ω ) p ≃ (2 p ) ω and all B ∈ (2 ω ) q ≃ (2 q ) ω , we have
Figure 7: Interpretation of SMSO-Formulae as Uniform Automata.
We now turn to step (2) . Let ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ϕ be SMSO-formulae with free variables among x = x 1 , . . . , x p and X = X 1 , . . . , X q . Then we say that a synchronous function
Theorem 5.10 (Adequacy). Let ϕ, ϕ be SMSO-formulae with variables among x, X.
Adequacy of realizability, together with Prop. 5.7, directly gives Theorem 3.7.
(1).
Corollary 5.11 (Thm. 3.7. (1)). Consider an SMSO-formula ϕ(X; Y ) with only X, Y free and with with X = X 1 , . . . , X q and
The proof of Thm. 5.10 goes by induction on derivations. Most of the rules of SMSO are straightforward, excepted the synchronous comprehension rule, that we discuss first. Adequacy for synchronous comprehension follows from the existence of finite-state characteristic functions for bounded formulae (Lem. 4.8) and from the following lemmas, which allow us, given a synchronous function Cφ y-represented byφ, to lift a realizer of ψ[φ[y]/Y ] to a realizer of ∃Y ψ.
Lemma 5.12 (Substitution Lemma for Synchronous Comprehension)
. Let x = x 1 , . . . , x p and X = X 1 , . . . , X q . Letφ be a formula with free variables among y, X, and assume that ϕ y-represents Cφ : 2 q −→ M 2. Then for every SMSO-formula ψ with free variables among x, X, for all k ∈ (2 ω ) p , and all A ∈ (2 ω ) q , we have
Proof. By induction on ψ.
• If ψ is an atomic formula not of the form (x∈ Y ), then ψ[φ[y]/Y ] = ψ and the result is obvious.
Since ψ is deterministic, we can take for H ψ the unique map
Then sinceφ y-represents Cφ, by (4.1) (Def. 4.1), for all k ∈ (2 ω ) p , and all A ∈ (2 ω ) q , we have
Then we are done since it follows from Prop. 5.9 that
and we conclude by induction hypothesis.
• The cases of ψ of the form ∃X ϕ or ∃x ϕ are similar, using Prop. 5.7 instead of Prop. 5.6.
• The case of ψ of the form ¬ϕ follows from Prop. 5.8 and the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 5.13 (Lifting Lemma for Synchronous Comprehension)
. Let x = x 1 , . . . , x p and X = X 1 , . . . , X q . Letφ be a formula with free variables among y, X, and assume thatφ y-represents Cφ : 2 q −→ M 2. Then for every SMSO-formula ψ with free variables among x, X, there is a finite-state synchronous function
• If ψ is an atomic formula not of the form (x∈ Y ), then ψ[φ[y]/Y ] = ψ. So we take the identity for H ψ and the result trivially follows.
Since ψ is deterministic, we can take for
, and the result follows from Lem. 5.12.
• If ψ is of the form ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 (resp. ∃X ϕ, ∃x ϕ) then we conclude by induction hypothesis and Prop. 5.6 (resp. Prop. 5.7).
/Y ]) = 1, and H ψ is the identity. We then conclude by Lem. 5.12.
Adequacy for synchronous comprehension follows easily.
Lemma 5.14 (Adequacy of Synchronous Comprehension). Let ψ with free variables among x, X, Y and letφ be a formula with free variables among y, X and which is uniformly bounded by y. Then there is a finite-state realizer ψ[φ[y]/Y ] x,X F : ∃Y ψ, effectively computable from ψ and ϕ.
Proof. Let Cφ satisfying (4.1) be given by Lem. 4.8, and let H ψ satisfying (5.4) be given by Lem. 5.13. It then directly follows from Prop. 5.7 and Lem. 5.
∃Y ψ, where π, π ′ are suitable projections.
We can now prove of Thm. 5.10.
Proof of Thm. 5.10. The proof is by induction on derivations. Note that if ϕ ⊢ SMSO ϕ, then ϕ |= N ϕ. In particular, for all rules whose conclusion is of the form ϕ ⊢ δ with δ deterministic, it follows from Prop. 5.9 and (5.1) that the unique M-map with codomain M (δ) ≃ 1 (and with appropriate domain) is a realizer. This handles the rules of negative comprehesion (3.1), deterministic induction (3.2) and of elimination of double negation on deterministic formulae (3.3) . This also handles all the rules of Fig. 5 excepted the rules of elimination of equality
and the rules ϕ ⊢ ∃y Z(y) and ϕ ⊢ ∃y S(x, y). For the latter, we use the DMM depicted in Fig. 1 (left) (Ex. 2.4 . (2)) together with the fact that S(−, −) is deterministic. The case of the former is similar and simpler. As for elimination of equality, we take as realizer of the conclusion the realizer of the left premiss. This realizer is trivially correct if there is no realizer of the assumptions ϕ. Otherwise the result follows from Prop. 5.9 since the right premiss ensures that the individual variables y and z are interpreted by the same natural number. Adequacy for synchronous comprehension is given by Lem. 5.14. It remains to deal with the rules of Fig. 3 . The first two rules follow from the fact that each Aut Σ is a category with finite products (Prop. 5.6). The rules for ¬/⊥ are trivial since their conclusions are of the form ϕ ⊢ δ. The rules for conjunction follow from Prop. 5.6 and those for existential quantifications follow from Prop. 5.7.
Indexed Structure on Automata
In §5 we have defined one category Aut Σ for each alphabet Σ. These categories are actually related by substitution functors arising from M-morphisms, inducing a fibred structure. Substitution functors are a basic notion of categorical logic, which allows for categorical axiomatizations of quantifications. We refer to e.g. [9, Chap. 1] for background.
We present here the fibred structure of the categories Aut (−) and shows that the existential quantifiers ∃ (−) and Cartesian product − × − of §5.2 satisfy the expected properties of existential quantifiers and conjunction in categorical logic. These properties essentially correspond to the adequacy of the logical rules of Fig. 3 that do not mention negation (¬) nor falsity (⊥). Although the fibred structure is not technically necessary to prove the adequacy of our realizability model, following such categorical axiomatization was a guideline in its design. Besides, categorical logic turns out to be an essential tool when dealing with generalizations to (say) alternating automata.
6.1. The Basic Idea. Before entering the details, let us try to explain the main ideas in the usual setting of first-order logic over a multisorted individual language. The categorical semantics of existential quantifications is given by an adjunction which is usually represented as
This adjunction induces a bijection between (the interpretations of) proofs of the sequents ϕ(x) ⊢ ψ and ∃x.ϕ(x) ⊢ ψ, that we informally denote
Now, in general the variable x occurs free in ϕ. As a consequence, in order to properly formulate (6.1) one should be able to interpret sequents of the form ϕ(x) ⊢ ψ with free variables. More generally, the formulae ϕ and ψ should be allowed to contain free variables distinct from x. The idea underlying the general method (but see e.g. [9] for details), is to first devise a base category B of individuals, whose objects interpret products of sorts of the individual language, and whose maps from say ι 1 ×· · ·×ι m to o 1 ×· · ·×o n represent n-tuples (t 1 , . . . , t n ) of terms t i of sort o i whose free variables are among x ι 1 , . . . , x ιm (with x ι j of sort ι j ). Then, for each object ι = ι 1 × · · · × ι n of B, one devises a category E ι whose objects represent formulae with free variables among x ι 1 , . . . , x ιn , and whose morphisms interpret proofs. Furthermore, B-morphisms
The functor t ⋆ takes (the interpretation of) a formula ϕ whose free variables are among y o 1 , . . . , y on to (the interpretation of) the formula ϕ[t 1 /y o 1 , . . . , t n /y on ] with free variables among x ι 1 , . . . , x ιm . Its action on the morphisms of E o 1 ×···×on allows us to interpret the substitution rule
In very good situations, the operation (−) ⋆ is itself functorial. Among the morphisms of B, one usually requires the existence of projections, say
Projections induce substitution functors, called weakening functors
which simply allow us to see formula ψ(y o ) with free variable y o as a formula ψ(y o , x ι ) with free variables among y o , x ι (but with no actual occurrence of x ι ). Then the proper formulation of (6.1) is that existential quantification over x ι is a functor
(where x ι does not occur free in ψ since ψ is assumed to be (interpreted as) an object of E o , thus replacing the usual side condition). Universal quantifications are dually axiomatized as right adjoints to weakening functors. In both cases, the adjunctions are subject to additional conditions (called the Beck-Chevalley conditions) which ensure that they are preserved by substitution and the soundness of their elimination rules. We now characterize the language of A [M] . To this end, it is useful to note that Σ ω is in bijection with the set of synchronous functions 1 ω → Σ ω . Proposition 6.2. Given a DMM M : Σ → Γ and an automaton A : Γ, for B ∈ Σ ω we have: 
satisfying the following universal property: for each automaton B : Σ and each Aut Σ×Γ -morphism
there is a unique Aut Σ -morphism
Note that η A must be an M-morphism
So we let η A be the M-morphism induced by the projection
, we are left with the following trivial fact: there is a unique ∃ Γ A H : B such that
The Beck-Chevalley condition of [9, Def. 1.9.1] asks for the following isomorphism in Aut ∆ , where A : Σ × Γ and F : ∆ → M Σ:
This isomorphism follows from the fact that the two above automata have the same set of moves (namely Γ × M (A)).
6.4. Categorical Conjunction. Recall from §5.2 that each category Aut Σ has Cartesian products, which interpret conjunction, a necessary feature to interpret a sequent as a morphism from the conjunct of its premises to its conclusions. In the setting of categorical logic, it remains to be shown that these products are fibred in the sense of [9, Def. 1.8.1], i.e., they are preserved by substitution. Proof. The isomorphism easily follows from the fact that
6.5. Indexed Structure. The substitution operation discussed in §6.2 allows for each Mmorphism F : Σ → Γ to induce a functor (−)[M F ] : Aut Γ → Aut Σ , where M F is a chosen DMM inducing F . As usual in categorical logic, we would like to extend substitution to a functor (−) ⋆ : M op → Cat taking alphabets Σ to categories Aut Σ , and M-morphisms F : Σ → Γ to functors Aut Γ → Aut Σ . In order for (−) ⋆ to be a functor, it should preserve identities and composition. In particular, given an automaton A : Σ, for all M-maps G : ∆ → Γ and F : Γ → Σ we should have
But we see no reason for this to be possible. In particular there is no reason for the DMM M F •G chosen to induce F • G to be a product of M F and M G . However, since A[M] always has the same moves as A, we actually get (6.4) modulo isomorphisms. This is a usual situation in categorical logic. It is indeed customary to relax the requirement of (−) ⋆ to be a functor, and only ask it to be a pseudo functor, i.e. a functor for which identities and composition are only preserved up to natural isomorphisms, subject to some specific coherence conditions (see e.g. [9, Def. 1.4.4]). The required natural isomorphisms have the form
Since A and A[M] have the same moves, we can take for each components of η Σ and µ F,G synchronous functions acting as identities on runs. It then follows that all the required diagrams commute. We now proceed to the formal construction. Fix for each M-morphism F : Σ → Γ a chosen DMM M F inducing F . For each A : Σ, and each M-morphisms G : ∆ → Γ and F : Γ → Σ, we let
be given by
The following Proposition says that the coherence conditions required for structure maps of pseudo-functors (see e.g. [9, Def. 1.4.4]) are met by η Σ,A and µ F,G,A . The proof is trivial.
Proposition 6.5. The morphisms η Σ and µ F,G defined above are natural isomorphisms as in (6.5). Moreover, for each automaton A : Σ and each M-maps F, G, H of appropriate domains and codomains, the two diagrams of Fig. 8 commute.
The assignment (−) ⋆ : M op → Cat taking the alphabet Σ to the category Aut Σ and the morphism F : Γ → M Σ to the functor (−)[M F ] : Aut Σ → Aut Γ is thus a pseudo-functor.
Conclusion
In this paper, we revisited Church's synthesis via an automata-based realizability interpretation of an intuitionistic proof system SMSO for MSO on ω-words, and we demonstrated that our approach is sound and complete, in the sense of Thm. 3.7. As it stands, this approach must still pay the price of the non-elementary lower-bound for the translation of MSO formulae over finite words to DFA's (see Rem. 4.9) and the system SMSO is limited by its set of connectives and its restricted induction scheme. Further Works. First, the indexed structure ( §6.5) induced by the substitution operation of §6.2 suggests that in our context, it may be profitable to work in a conservative extension of (S)MSO, with one function symbol for each Mealy machine together with defining axioms of the form (4.2). In particular, this could help mitigate Rem. 4.9 by giving the possibility, in the synchronous comprehension scheme of SMSO, to give a term for a Mealy machine rather than the MSO-formula representing it. We expect this to give better lower bounds w.r.t. completeness (for each solvable instance of Church's synthesis, to provide proofs with realizers of a reasonable complexity).
Second, following the approach of [21] , SMSO could be extended with primitive universal quantifications and implications as soon as one goes to a linear deduction system. Among outcomes of going to a linear deduction system, following [21] we expect similar proof-theoretical properties as with the usual Dialectica interpretation (see e.g. [11] ), such as realizers of linear Markov rules and choices schemes. Also, having primitive universal quantifications may allow us to take benefit of the reductions of MSO to its negative fragment, as provided by the Safraless approaches to synthesis [13, 12, 5] .
Obtaining a good handle of induction in SMSO is more complex. One possibility to have finite-state realizers for a more general induction rule would be to rely on saturation techniques for regular languages. Another possibility, which may be of practical interest, is to follow the usual Curry-Howard approach and allow for possibly infinite-state realizers.
Another direction of future work is to incorporate specific reasoning principles on Mealy machines. For instance, a possibility could be to base our deduction system on a complete equational theory for Mealy machines.
S is the Successor for<:
∀x, y S(x, y) ←→ x< y ∧ ¬∃z(x< z< y)
Strict Linear Order Axioms:
Predecessor and Unboundedness Axioms:
∀x ∃y(y< x) −→ ∃yS(y, x) ∀x∃y(x< y) Figure 9 : The Arithmetic Axioms of [20] .
•≤ is a partial order:
• Basic Z and S rules (total injective relations):
= y ′ ) ⊢ x≤ y We now proceed to the proof of the properties listed in Fig. 6 .
Proof. From reflexivity of equality.
(2) x< y, y< z ⊢ x< z Proof. We have x< y, y< z ⊢ x≤ z and x< y, y< z, x . = z ⊢ ⊥ by the partial order rules for≤. 
From which follows that
Proof. The basic and arithmetic rules above ensure that every x has a successor y, and that the successor satisfies x≤ y. Thus, in combination with (3), we get that x< y.
and by the partial order rules for≤ together with the second arithmetic rule, we have S(y, y ′ ), x≤ y, x . = y ′ ⊢ y ′ . = y and we conclude by (3).
(6) Z(x) ⊢ x≤ y Proof. By induction on y.
(7) x≤ y, Z(y) ⊢ Z(x) Proof. By (6), we have Z(y) ⊢ y≤ x and we conclude by the partial order rule for≤.
(8) ∀y(x≤ y) ⊢ Z(x) Proof. We have ∀y(x≤ y), Z(z) ⊢ x≤ z Hence by (7) we get ∀y(x≤ y), Z(z) ⊢ Z(x) and we conclude by the basic rules for Z. Assume that y is the successor of x and an intermediate z such that x< z< y (in particular, we have x< y by (2)). By (10), y≤ z. But then it means that z = y by z≤ y by antisymmetry, which is contradictory.
Conversely, assume that x< y without any intermediate z. Assume ¬S(x, y) towards a contradiction. But there exists some z such that S(x, z). Clearly, x< z by (3). But we also have z≤ y by (9) and ¬y . = z by assumption, so z< y. This contradicts our assumption of non-existence of intermediate z.
This concludes the proof of Lem. 2.17.
The linear order axioms ( (1), (2), (12)), the successor axiom (13), the unboundedness (4) and predecessor (11) axioms are thus proved in our axiomatic.
Finally, we have to prove Lem. 2.18, namely that strong induction is derivable in MSO. The proof holds no surprise. Notice that φ[x] is equivalent to φ ′ [x ′ ] := ∀y(y< x ′ → X(y)) using (11) . Using trichotomy (12), we have three subcase according to:
The first case enables to use φ ′ [x ′ ] directly, and the second requires to use the hypothesis of<-induction ∀x(∀y(y< x → X(y)) → X(x) together with φ ′ [x ′ ]. The last one leads to a contradiction using antisymmetry of≤ together with z< x ′ = z≤ x ′ ∧ ¬z . = x ′ .
Appendix B. Internally Bounded Formulae ( §4.4)
We prove here the Splitting Lemma 4.13, used in the proof of Thm. 4.11. We consider MSO-formulae over the vocabulary of [20] , that is formulae given by the grammar ϕ, ψ ∈ Λ ::= x∈ X | x< y | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ∃X ϕ | ∃x ϕ Lemma B.1 (Splitting (Lem. 4.13)). Let ψ be a formula in Λ and let z ∈ FV ι (ψ). For every V ⊆ FV ι (ψ) with z ∈ V , one can produce natural number N ψ and two matching sequences of length N ψ of left formulae (L V (ψ) j ) j<N ψ and right formulae (R V (ψ) j ) j<N ψ such that the following holds: to whether x ∈ V or not.
• If ψ = ϕ ∨ φ, then it is clear that taking the concatenation of the sequences of formulae given by the induction hypothesis is enough
• If ψ = ∃x.φ, using our induction hypothesis, we have N φ ∈ N and sequences of formulae (L V (φ) j , R V (φ) j , L V ∪{x} (φ) j , R V ∪{x} (φ) j ) j<N φ satisfying the conclusion of the theorem. For i < N φ , define
The disjunction is seen to be equivalent to ∃x.φ by making a case analysis over whether x ≤ n holds.
